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Saxe: Politics versus Precision: Did the Miami-Dade School Board Violat

POLITICS VERSUS PRECISION: DID THE MIAMI-DADE
SCHOOL BOARD VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT WHEN IT
VOTED TO REMOVE ¡VAMOS A CUBA! FROM ITS DISTRICT
LIBRARIES?
ACLU v. Miami-Dade County School Board, 557 F.3d 1177
(11th Cir. 2009)
Lindsay M. Saxe*
Juan Amador, a self-described political prisoner from Cuba, was
outraged when he read the inaccurate portrayal of life in Cuba contained
in ¡Vamos a Cuba!,1 a book in his daughter’s elementary school
library.2 Amador promptly requested that the school remove the book
from its library because the book was untruthful and “‘portray[ed] a life
in Cuba that does not exist.’”3 At the end of a lengthy, four-tiered
administrative review process, the Miami-Dade County School Board
(School Board) voted to remove the book from all school district
libraries.4
In response, another parent and two organizations, the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the student government association,
sued the School Board in federal district court, alleging that its actions
*

J.D. May 2009. A special thank you to my family, friends, Professor Dennis Calfee,
Margaret Ayres and R.D. and Judy Brown—I would not be where I am today without your
guidance and support.
1. ALTA SCHREIER, ¡VAMOS A CUBA! (2000); ¡Vamos a Cuba! is the Spanish language
version of “A Visit to Cuba,” the book that spawned the litigation. Id. Before the respondent’s
removal order, there were forty-nine copies spread amongst the district’s thirty-three elementary
and middle schools. Id. at 1183. Consistent with the present court’s opinion, this Comment will
adopt the Spanish-language title, ¡Vamos a Cuba!, as a means of identifying all forty-nine
copies of the book. Id.
2. ACLU v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1182 (11th Cir. 2009)
(Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II).
3. Id. (quoting ACLU v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 439 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1247
(S.D. Fla. 2006) (Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. I)).
4. Id. After reading the book, Amador initiated the school district’s four-tiered
administrative process, which reviews citizen requests for the removal of books from the
district’s libraries. Id. at 1183–84. This process begins with an initial complaint to a school’s
principal, who does not have authority to remove the book, but may explain why the book is in
the library’s collection. Id. at 1184. If unsatisfied with the explanation, the citizen may file a
formal request for removal, which is heard by the School Materials Review Committee, an ad
hoc group of professional educators, administrators, parents, teachers, students, and library
specialists. Id. The School Materials Review Committee’s recommendation regarding the
book’s removal can be appealed to the superintendent, who can either issue a decision based on
the committee’s recommendation or submit the appeal to the District Material Review
Committee, a similar ad hoc group of educational professionals and interested individuals. Id.
Once the District Committee makes a recommendation to the superintendent, the superintendent
makes a decision. Id. As a final administrative measure, the superintendent’s decision may be
appealed to the school board, which issues the final ruling on behalf of the school system. Id.
921
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violated the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause.5 The district
court denied the Board’s motion to dismiss the complaint,6 issued a
preliminary injunction enjoining the School Board from enforcing its
removal order, and ordered that any books already removed be returned
to the district’s libraries.7 On review, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
preliminary injunction, remanded the case, and HELD that even if the
First Amendment applied to book removal decisions, the Board’s
actions did not violate it.8
Neither teachers nor students forsake their constitutional rights to
free speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.9 The Supreme Court
has repeatedly affirmed the importance of First Amendment protections
in the school context while also recognizing the authority of school
officials to control student conduct.10 Because school libraries play an
integral part in facilitating classroom discussion, federal courts
generally view the removal of books by school boards for censorship
purposes as imposing a serious burden on freedom of discussion,
implicating First Amendment protections.11 Therefore, while courts
often grant school boards significant discretion in determining the
contents of school libraries, a school board’s motivation for removing a
5. Id. at 1183.
6. Id. at 1189. The defendants sought dismissal on the basis that the ACLU did not have
organizational standing to bring the suit through its member Mark Balzli, whose son attended a
school within the school district, because any First Amendment right to the school’s library
books belonged to the student and not the parent, and Balzli’s son was not a member of the
ACLU. Id.
7. Id. at 1190.
8. Id. at 1230.
9. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Tinker, the
seminal case balancing a student’s right to free speech and a school’s right to control classroom
conduct, involved a passive student protest of the Vietnam War. Id. at 504. When the
respondent found out that students planned to wear black armbands to school as a symbol of
their objection to the war, they adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband would be
asked to remove it and threatened with suspension. Id. Ultimately, the Court held that the
respondent could not prohibit this form of student expression because it neither interfered with
school activities nor caused any disruption that might have justified the respondent’s actions. Id.
at 505, 513–14. “[T]he wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case was entirely
divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it. It was
closely akin to ‘pure speech’ which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive
protection under the First Amendment.” Id. at 505–06. See also RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER,
Freedom of Expression Issues and Public Education, in 1 EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT,
DUE PROCESS AND DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION, § 2:3 (2004 & Supp. 2007); Erwin
Chemerinsky, How Will Morse v. Frederick Be Applied?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 17, 19–20
(2008) (noting that in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has not followed the holding in
Tinker that student speech can only be punished if it is actually disruptive of school activities).
10. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); SCHNEIDER, supra
note 9, § 2:3.
11. 16B EUGENE MCQUILLIN, Public Education: School Boards and School Districts, in
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS XX, § 46.09.05 (3d ed. West 2008).
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book is subject to scrutiny in cases challenging book removal
decisions.12
In this area of the law, the primary guide for federal courts is the
Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Education v. Pico.13 In Pico, the
petitioner school board gave an unofficial directive that certain books be
removed from library shelves and delivered to it for review.14 The
school board later issued a press release justifying its actions,
characterizing the books as “‘anti-American, anti-Christian, antiSem[i]tic, and just plain filthy,’” and announcing that it had a duty, a
“‘moral obligation,’” to protect children from the danger presented by
the books.15 After reviewing a claim challenging the school board’s
actions under the First Amendment, a plurality of the Supreme Court
affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision to remand the case for trial.16
Because of the fractured nature of the Court’s decision, however, the
case did not establish a binding First Amendment standard for book
removal cases.17 Justice Brennan, writing the lead opinion, found that
the First Amendment prohibited school boards from removing books
“simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and
seek by their removal to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.’”18 A school board
could constitutionally remove a book, however, if the book lacked
“educational suitability.”19 Only two justices, Justice Marshall and
Justice Stevens, joined Justice Brennan’s opinion in full.20 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice Brennan’s
First Amendment standard, but also formulated his own standard.21 In
addition, according to Justice Blackmun, a school board could
constitutionally remove a book if it contained offensive language, if it
was not appropriate for its intended age group, or if the ideas it
12. Id.
13. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
14. Id. at 857.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 860, 875.
17. See infra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Blackmun’s First
Amendment standard in contrast to Justice Brennan’s standard).
18. Pico, 457 U.S. at 872 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943)). There were four dissenters—Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
O’Connor—who argued that the First Amendment did not limit a school board’s power to
remove books. Id. at 885 (Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 893 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 921
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 871 (plurality opinion).
20. Id. at 855.
21. Id. at 879–80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Blackmun found that “school officials may not remove books for the purpose of
restricting access to the political ideas or social perspectives discussed in them, when that action
is motivated simply by the officials’ disapproval of the ideas involved.” Id.
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advanced were “‘manifestly inimical to the public welfare.’”22 Justice
White did not express an opinion on the First Amendment question, but
voted with the plurality for purely procedural reasons.23
Ultimately, only four Justices in Pico found that the First
Amendment applied to book removal cases. Four other Justices
dissented, finding that the First Amendment did not apply at all.24 The
final Justice expressed no opinion on the constitutional issue.25 In effect,
then, there was no majority decision on whether the First Amendment
applies to book removal decisions.26 Therefore, federal courts interpret
Pico as a non-precedent, despite the plurality’s articulation of a
constitutional standard, because the Court failed to establish a clear and
binding First Amendment standard in book removal cases.27
To complicate matters, the Court never decided another book
removal case. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,28 the Court
addressed the applicability of First Amendment protections to a schoolsponsored student newspaper, which was described as a part of the
school curriculum.29 It is unclear, however, whether book removal
decisions are an aspect of school curriculum and therefore subject to the
Hazelwood standard.30
In Hazelwood, the school principal ordered that two pages of the
student newspaper, which contained stories about pregnant students and
the impact of divorce on students, be withheld from publication.31 In
22. Id. at 880 (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)).
23. Id. at 883–84 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Court should
not decide constitutional questions unless it is necessary to do so).
24. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
25. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
26. See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text. Four Justices found the petitioner’s
conduct unconstitutional, four found it constitutional, and one expressed no opinion on the
matter. See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text.
27. See Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1045 n.30 (Former 5th
Cir. 1982); Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 895 F. Supp. 1463, 1468–69 (D. Kan. 1995). See
generally Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 756 (1980) (explaining that because plurality opinions do not contain a single
line of reasoning that garnered the support of a majority of the Court, they provide spotty
guidance and present problems of interpretation and application for lower courts).
28. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
29. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
30. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d 1177, 1201–02 (11th Cir. 2009).
31. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263–64. The principal was concerned that even though the
names of the pregnant girls had been removed, they would still be identifiable from the text of
the article, and that the discussion of birth control and sexual activity would be inappropriate for
some of the school’s younger students. Id. at 263. Moreover, the principal thought that the
parents of the girl who was discussed in the article on divorce ought to have been given a
chance to respond to the girl’s comments. Id. Because he felt that the necessary changes could
not be made before the date on which the paper was scheduled to go to press, he told the paper’s
faculty director to remove the offending pages or risk not having the paper printed at all. Id. at
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response to the student author’s claim that preventing publication of the
articles violated the respondent’s First Amendment rights, the Court
allowed the school to censor the newspaper in order to “‘disassociate
itself’ from speech that would ‘substantially interfere with [its] work or
impinge upon the rights of other students.’”32 The Court distinguished
Hazelwood from its student speech precedents by reasoning that
suppression of a student’s personal expression on school premises
differed from control over school-sponsored activities that “members of
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school.”33 Accordingly, the Court held that the school had greater
authority to control speech in this case because the student newspaper
could fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum.34 Thus,
school administrators would not violate the First Amendment as “long
as their actions were reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”35
In the present case, the School Board ordered the removal of A Visit
to Cuba or ¡Vamos a Cuba! from its libraries.36 ¡Vamos a Cuba! is part
of a series developed for children ages five to seven years old to provide
basic information about the lives of children in other countries.37
Reversing the findings of two ad hoc committees of professional
educators as well as the superintendent, the School Board voted six to
three to remove the book.38 In response, the district court ordered the
School Board put ¡Vamos a Cuba! back on library shelves.39 The
Eleventh Circuit reversed, but in doing so, did not decide whether the
Hazelwood or Pico standard applied to the respondent’s actions, or to
book removal cases in general.40 Rather, the court reasoned that even if
264–65.
32. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist., No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) and Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)).
33. Id.
34. Id. The Court gave some examples of activities constituting part of school curriculum,
which it said did not have to occur in a traditional classroom setting, including school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that could reasonably be
attributed to the school. Id. It added that the activities could be so characterized if “supervised
by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants
and audiences.” Id. (footnote omitted).
35. Id. at 273.
36. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d 1177, 1182 (11th Cir. 2009). See supra note 1.
37. See Heinemann Library, A Visit To, http://www.heinemannlibrary.com/products/series.asp?
id=1432912828 (last visited June 27, 2009) (indicating that the publisher intends the series to be
used for children ages five to seven as a guide to help them understand what it is like to live, go
to school, and participate in traditional ceremonies in other countries).
38. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1188.
39. Id. at 1190.
40. Id. at 1202 (finding that the question of what standard applies to school library book
removal is unresolved).
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the most exacting standard announced by the Pico plurality applied,41
petitioners would lose if the respondent could show that it removed
¡Vamos a Cuba! not because it disagreed with the ideas in the book, but
because it had legitimate pedagogical concerns about the book’s
accuracy.42 Given the court’s assumption that Pico’s First Amendment
standard applied, the court determined de novo the constitutional facts
of the case—the respondent’s motive in removing the book.43
After reviewing the record, the court concluded that the School
Board did not violate the Pico standard because the School Board’s
motive for removing ¡Vamos a Cuba! stemmed from factual
inaccuracies in the book.44 Based on its review of the book, the court
went on to make its own findings that ¡Vamos a Cuba! indisputably
contained gross inaccuracies.45 Specifically, the majority found most
troubling the book’s pattern of comparing life in Cuba to that in the
United States with the generalized statement that people live, work, and
play “like you do[.]”46 According to the court, this blanket statement
41. Id.; see also supra note 18 (discussing judicial opinions in Pico).
42. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1202. The court reasoned that a school
board’s demand for factual accuracy was not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Id. at
1222.
43. Id. at 1206–07. When a preliminary injunction is granted by a district court, it is
subject to a mixed standard of review. See SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195,
1198 (11th Cir. 1999). The reviewing court will assess the decision to grant the preliminary
injunction under an “abuse of discretion” standard, while questions of law supporting the
injunction are reviewed de novo. Id. Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Id. In MiamiDade County Sch. Bd. II, given the majority’s assumption regarding the constitutional standard
that applied, it had to determine the “why” facts, or the school board’s motive, de novo because
it was the core constitutional fact underlying the district court’s decision. Miami-Dade County
Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d 1177, 1206–07 (11th Cir. 2009). The dissenting opinion agreed that the
court should have reviewed respondent’s motive de novo, but added that the majority should
have shown higher deference to the district court’s other findings of fact. Id. at 1232 (Wilson, J.,
dissenting). Thus, the dissent argued that the majority included many other fact findings that
required greater deference in the court’s review. Id.
44. Id. at 1207 (majority opinion). The court explained that there were nine members of
the school board, six of whom voted to remove ¡Vamos a Cuba!. Id. at 1209. Five of the six
board members who voted for removal said that their vote was motivated by the factual
inaccuracies in the book. Id.
45. Id. at 1211. The court classified these as inaccuracies based on affirmative
misstatements and inaccuracies by omission. Id. For example, the third sentence in ¡Vamos a
Cuba! says that people eat, work, and go to school like children in the United States. Id. at 1212
(citing Transcript of Record at 28). The court found that in Cuba, food is rationed by the
government and has been for a number of years, there is little private work and it is a crime to
engage in private practice of a profession, and children are required to engage in unpaid
agricultural work or be expelled from school. Id. (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 1212–14, 1224 (quoting Transcript of Record at 19:216). The district court
found that the “like you do” statements in ¡Vamos a Cuba! were apolitical and content-neutral.
Id. at 1224 (citing Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. I, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1283 (S.D. Fla.
2006)). Disagreeing, the majority in Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II found that regardless of
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covered up the fact that people in Cuba live under a totalitarian,
communist regime with a poor human rights record, are subject to
severe restrictions on individual liberties, and face a booming child sex
trade.47 In a book about Cuba, the statement “like you do” could not be
described as any more apolitical or content-neutral than the same
statement in a book about the Third Reich, North Korea, or the
antebellum South.48
The court also took issue with the district court’s use of the term
“book banning.”49 Historically, the practice of book banning has been
based on a government’s political or moral objections to the book’s
contents.50 Thus contemporary use of the term has a politically charged,
pejorative connotation.51 Here, the court classified the use of the term as
“overwrought rhetoric” and reasoned that it did not apply in book
removal decisions because such decisions do not prevent anyone from
owning, possessing, or reading the book.52 It simply prevented students
from accessing the book at a school library.53
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s
finding that correcting the factual errors in ¡Vamos a Cuba! would
politics, the “like you do” statement was inaccurate. Id. The district court also found that a large
number of the inaccuracies were inconsequential and that most of the omissions were proper in
light of the age level and purpose of the book. Id. at 1232 ((Wilson, J., dissenting) (citing
Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. I, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 n.42)).
47. Id. at 1213–14 (majority opinion); see also CIA World Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html (last visited June 27,
2009) (noting under “transnational issues” that “Cuba is principally a source country for women
and children trafficked within the country for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation and
possibly for forced labor; the country is a destination for sex tourism, including child sex
tourism”).
48. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1224.
49. Id. at 1217–18. The district court found that by “totally banning the Cuba books and
the rest of the Series, the School Board is in fact prohibiting even the voluntary consideration of
the themes contained in the books by students at their leisure.” Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. I,
439 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.
50. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1217–18.
51. See Mark Sableman, Artistic Expression Today: Can Artists Use the Language of Our
Culture?, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 187, 191 (2007) (“Book bannings are generally classified today
like the witch hunts of the past.”); see also Kathleen McGrory & Jay Weaver, Court: Miami
Schools Can Yank Book on Cuba, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 6, 2009 (“[T]he three-judge panel’s
opinion—not unlike the School Board’s initial vote—was so fraught with political rhetoric such
as ‘book banning’ that further appeals seem inevitable.”).
52. See Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1218. But see id. at 1230 (Wilson,
J., dissenting); Claire Mullally, firstamendmentcenter.org: Libraries & First Amendment
Speech, Banned Books, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/libraries/topic.aspx?top
ic=banned_books (last visited on June 27, 2009) (describing the historical practice of book
banning and applying the term to the modern practice of removing books from school and
public libraries).
53. See Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1218 (majority opinion).
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result in a book educationally unsuitable for young children.54 The
majority gave two primary reasons for its disagreement. First, as a
practical matter, simple removal of the phrase “like you do” could not
possibly result in a book unsuitable for young children.55 Second, the
educational suitability of a book was a policy matter better left to local
government and was not within the purview of the district court.56
At the outset, it is somewhat difficult to reconcile the court’s call for
judicial restraint with the analysis it must undertake to determine
whether a school board’s motive was permissible under the Pico
standard.57 If the educational suitability of a book is the proffered
reason for the book’s removal, then a federal court must necessarily
engage in some review of the book’s educational suitability.58
Moreover, given the court’s reasoning that ¡Vamos a Cuba! is
inaccurate throughout because it omits key facts,59 it seems unlikely a
simple removal of the “like you do” statement would result in an
accurate portrayal of life in Cuba.
By reviewing the district court’s findings of fact apart from the
respondent’s motive in removing ¡Vamos a Cuba!, the court also
appeared to overstep its own authority.60 When a court reviews an order
for a preliminary injunction, ordinary, non-constitutional facts are
subject to a more deferential, clearly erroneous standard of review.61 In
contrast, constitutional facts are subject to de novo review.62 Under the
majority’s First Amendment analysis, the only fact subject to de novo
review was the district court’s finding regarding the respondent’s

54. Id. at 1225.
55. Id.
56. Id. The majority added that “[f]ederal courts should not arrogate to themselves power
over educational suitability questions.” Id.
57. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan
found that the First Amendment prohibited school boards from removing books “simply
because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to ‘prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.’” Id.
58. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1244 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
59. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
60. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1232 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
61. Id.; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text; 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: RULES 64 to
65.1, § 2962 (2d ed. 1995) (“The trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether
the situation requires the issuance of either a temporary or a permanent injunction and the fact
that the appellate court reaches a contrary conclusion does not warrant a reversal. The scope of
review is limited to determining whether the lower court violated some principle of equity or
abused its discretion under Rule 65. Furthermore, the district court’s findings of fact, which are
prepared under Rule 52(a) when it either grants or refuses injunctive relief, will not be set aside
unless they are clearly erroneous.”) (footnotes omitted).
62. See supra note 43 (discussing opposing views on whether the court could determine
“why” facts).
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motive.63 Despite this, the majority engaged in a de novo review of facts
beyond the constitutional fact.64 With the exception of the respondent’s
motive, the trial judge was arguably in a better position to make factual
determinations.65 Thus, the majority’s extensive fact-finding leaves it
open to the criticism that it treated the case as a decision on the merits
and not an appeal from a preliminary injunction.66
On the other hand, in the context of this case, many of the facts
found by the majority on de novo review could be viewed as integral
parts of the analysis in determining whether the respondent’s motive
violated the First Amendment.67 The judgments regarding school
boards’ motives, especially under Pico, encompass a wide array of facts
including the school boards’ conduct and particular characteristics of
books removed.
Another difficulty presented by this case is the notion that without a
clearly applicable constitutional standard, a reviewing court can analyze
the sufficiency of the evidence for a preliminary injunction in school
board book removal cases.68 In order for a plaintiff to successfully
obtain a preliminary injunction, she must show a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits.69 The plaintiff does not have to show that she
is certain to win.70 In the present case, the majority and dissent
employed different standards, and predictably, disagreed as to whether
there was a sufficient likelihood of success under the chosen standard.71
While the majority found that the petitioners did not make a sufficient
showing under the most favorable First Amendment standard from
Pico,72 the dissent found that the petitioners made a sufficient showing
under the more school board-deferential standard from Hazelwood.73
Furthermore, while this painstaking analysis was undertaken on the
basis that the First Amendment applies in such situations, it is not
entirely clear, given the outcome of Pico, that it does.74
63. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 577 F.3d at 1232; id. at 1232 (Wilson, J., dissenting);
see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
64. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1232 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (noting that the district court was well within its discretion to determine what was
the more persuasive and credible evidence).
66. Id.; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61 (discussing discretion in issuance of
injunctions).
67. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1222.
68. Given the four dissenters in Pico, there is also some doubt as to whether the First
Amendment even applies in school board book removal cases. See supra note 18.
69. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1232, 1233 n.2 (Wilson, J., dissenting);
see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 2948.3 (“All courts agree that plaintiff must present a
prima facie case but need not show that he is certain to win.”) (footnote omitted).
70. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 2948.3.
71. Compare Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1202 (majority opinion), with
id. at 1234 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1202 (majority opinion).
73. Id. at 1234 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
74. See supra note 68.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 11

930

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

This divergence of opinion demonstrates the difficulty of making the
“substantial likelihood” determination in the absence of an explicit First
Amendment standard. Without an established standard, it is difficult for
courts to review preliminary injunction orders, and for plaintiffs to
predict the likelihood of winning a motion for a preliminary injunction.
Moreover, until the United States Supreme Court definitively resolves
the issue, school boards lack clear notice of what book removal
practices, if any,75 violate the First Amendment.
Compounding the dearth of guidance from the Supreme Court on the
applicable First Amendment standard are the Eleventh Circuit panel’s
completely contradictory findings regarding whether the respondent
was politically motivated when it removed ¡Vamos a Cuba!76 Even
though the district court found overwhelming evidence that the
respondent’s removal of the book was primarily politically motivated,77
the majority reversed because the factual inaccuracies in ¡Vamos a
Cuba! constituted a legitimate reason for the book’s removal.78 On its
face, this finding seemed to discount several of the main facts that led to
the litigation. First, the original objection to the book was based on the
viewpoint of a former Cuban political prisoner and exile.79 Second, two
committees of professional educators, parents, and others recommended
retaining the book.80 Finally, most of the respondent’s members did not
read the other books in the “A Visit to” series before they voted to
remove all of them from the school district’s libraries.81
On the other hand, the initial objections to the book, as well as those
of the respondent and the majority in this case, are based on true
accounts of life under the totalitarian regime in Cuba.82 Given these
realities were omitted from the book ¡Vamos a Cuba! is not factually
accurate. Still unclear is whether the inclusion of all relevant facts in a
book intended to provide the most basic information to young children
is a tenable standard for judging books or for determining when a
75. See supra note 18.
76. See Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1236–37 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (reading the district court’s order as concluding that the respondent was using the
stated reasons for removing the book as a pretext for political views that opposed the Castro
regime).
78. Id. at 1236.
79. Id. at 1238 (quoting the district court’s reasoning that the truth or merit of Juan
Amador’s objections was not at issue, and noting that the actual issue was “the state’s
imposition of what shall be the orthodox view of Cuba”).
80. Id. at 1243.
81. Id. at 1243–44 (reasoning that the members’ failure to read the other removed books
suggests that the board’s majority may have had impermissible motives for removing them).
82. See supra notes 46–47.
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school district can constitutionally remove such books from its
libraries.83
The lack of clarity about the applicable First Amendment standard in
school board book removal cases, as well as the importance of speech
protections in the school context,84 demonstrates that the United States
Supreme Court should revisit Pico and provide federal courts with
greater guidance in this area. By failing to clarify Pico, the Supreme
Court has fomented confusion and opened the door to circuit-specific
standards, created on shaky and politically charged rationales.

83. See Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd. II, 557 F.3d at 1248 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
84. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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